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Indonesia has had a unique relationship with Islamic radicalism since the war for 
Indonesian independence in 1945. While the formation of an Islamic State in Indonesia has been 
at the forefront of radical movements since independence, the approaches to achieving this goal 
have changed drastically over time. This goal has also had multiple adversaries, from Dutch and 
Japanese colonialism, to the left-wing Sukarno regime, to the authoritarian Suharto regime, and 
finally the War on Terror. Across all of these different time periods, Islamic radicals in Indonesia 
have also had to contend with the different Muslim communities across the archipelago, many of 
whom are not keen on the creation of an Islamic State, as well as the non-Muslim minority who 
hold considerable political power despite their small numbers. The struggle for an Islamic State 
is a battle fought on many fronts, most of which domestic terrorists are losing due to a bilevel 
counterterrorism effort spearheaded by the Indonesian government and supported by the United 
States and Australia.
Although Indonesian domestic terrorism and counterterrorism alone is a rich and well 
studied field, I wanted to use my experiences at pesantrens (Islamic boardings schools) in Java to 
inspire a new approach to the study of this topic. I decided I wanted to better understand the role 
of pesantrens as both proponents and opponents of Islamic radicalism in Indonesia. It did not 
take long to recognize that for every pesantren with links to radical groups in Indonesia, there 
are countless others working tirelessly to confront radicalism in the classroom, as well as having 
to face growing stigma surrounding the reputation of Islamic education due to its links with 
domestic terrorism.  
Bruckner, 5 
As a result of the link between pesantrens and radicalism in Indonesia, pesantrens have 
the potential to become the strongest weapon in the Indonesian government’s arsenal for 
deradicalization in the country. Unfortunately, the government approach to deradicalization has 
been lackluster at best, as the American-backed War on Terror has made it easier to fight 
terrorism with an enhanced military and police state rather than diffusing radicalism in the 
classroom and the Mosque.  
There was quite a bit of scholarship to work through as I began the process of defining 
my topic for the purpose of this project. I decided that first and foremost I needed to have a 
strong understanding of the historical context of Indonesian domestic terrorism, and be able to 
recognize the defining moments in Indonesia’s history that lead to the creation and growth of 
radical movements within the archipelago. Secondly, I needed to focus my research of 
pesantrens into a few categories, which would give me a broad understanding of the topic 
without being inundated with too much information. In order to do this I created research 
questions that would be best answered through secondary source material research with an 
enhanced historical context. My research questions became: How have pesantrens been used to 
support radical movements within Indonesia? Have pesantrens often been at the forefront of 
counterterrorism and deradicalization efforts, both historically and in the modern day? Finally, 
how can pesantrens aid in deradicalization efforts while simultaneously countering the 
stereotype that Islamic boarding schools are “hotbeds” of domestic terrorism in Indonesia?  
As my research method had to be completely secondary source based due to being off-
site and working from home, there is little to discuss about the changing of my approach or 
revising my methods over time. However, my use of secondary sources did affect the structure of 
my paper, which I will now describe. Through my research I discovered that the history of 
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Islamic radicalism and domestic terrorism in Indonesia is incredibly rich and well-researched, 
and abridging a description of these historical processes would lead to an ill-informed project. As 
a result I had to devote quite a large number of pages to describing these historical processes in 
as much detail as I could spare without burdening the paper. At the beginning of my research 
process I assumed that domestic terrorism was a direct result of Dutch colonialism, which is true 
to a degree, but my historical research lead me to better understand how the complex 
relationships between the colonial powers, the new Indonesian state, the religious differences 
between Muslims and non-Muslims, and the complex ethnoreligious demographics of Indonesia 
all strongly affected the formation of radical groups as well as how those groups decided to carry 
out their call to jihad. This was the first section I wrote and is separated into four subsections by 
time period, and the researching and completion of this portion of the paper prepared me well for 
researching and better understanding the role of pesantrens within this broader historical context. 
Rather than explaining every instance of pesantrens supporting radical movements in 
Indonesia, I decided to focus exclusively on Pondok Ngruki, known as the “home base” of the 
Ngruki Network, a syndicate that was instrumental to the growth of Jema’ah Islamiyah. 
Although Pondok Ngruki carries an extremely negative reputation due to its history, I argue that 
Ngruki has modernized in a way that is necessary to fight the stigma which surrounds it. 
Although there has not been a formal adoption of peace education or deradicalization at Pondok 
Ngruki, I argue that the atmosphere is well suited for taking the next steps in deradicalizing a 
once extreme environment.  
Finally, I dedicate the last sections of the paper to what, in my opinion, would be the 
ideal series of steps needed in order to implement a widespread, community-backed, and 
successful deradicalization program across Indonesia. These include a twofold approach upheld 
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by both the Indonesian government in conjunction with smaller, grassroot organizations which 
would be able to provide “boots on the ground” support to each community, starting with the 
areas highlighted as “at risk” of radicalizing. Deradicalization efforts would also benefit from 
being modeled off of the same structure that radical groups take, including strong and inspiring 
leadership whose ideologies are both comforting and unifying. There needs to be a solid set of 
new ideologies formulated by the government with the direct support of Muslim scholars that is 
based on comprehensive Quranic thought, that focuses on tolerance and reconciliation. Most 
importantly, peace education needs to be a mandated part of the curriculum of every school, 
pesantren and secular, starting at a young age, in order to prepare young people to combat 
radical ideologies as they begin to be exposed to them as they grow older. Many of these 
approaches are being implemented across Indonesia, however I believe that there needs to be a 
strong and well-funded government approach in order to bring the puzzle pieces together and 
enact lasting change. Deradicalization will be a long and arduous process, however I believe that 
Indonesia already has the groundwork laid for a strong and effective counter-approach to Islamic 
extremism across the archipelago. The puzzle pieces have been flipped right-side-up, and now it 









A Brief Historical Overview of the Islamic Extremist Movements in 
Post-WWII Indonesia 
 
The focus of this paper is on the post WWII era, and the events that have shaped the 
greater radical movement as it is seen today in Indonesia. In order to better understand the 
historical context of Indonesian Islamic radicalism, the following section will provide a historical 
overview of the two major radical groups in Indonesia, Darul Islam (DI) and its successor 
Jema’ah Islamiyah (JI), as the movements transcended the three major eras of Indonesian 
politics, the era of Indonesian independence and Sukarno, Suharto, and post-Suharto eras. Each 
political era had distinct interactions with both Darul Islam as well as Jema’ah Islamiyah (from 
now on referenced as DI and JI), with each leader utilizing and combatting the two groups as 
needed depending on potential political gain. The close relationship between the Suharto 
administration and DI is especially significant as will be elaborated further on in the section. 
 
Indonesian Independence and the Sukarno Era 
It is generally agreed upon by scholars that Darul Islam was founded in 1947 by AS in West 
Java. Kartosuwirjo had been very active in the movement towards an Indonesian Islamic state 
since the 1920’s and was a member of the Partai Syarikat Islam (Islamic Union Party, from now 
on refered as the PSI), but became a proponent of jihad between 1945 and 1949 during the 
Indonesian struggle for independence from the Dutch. In Islam, jihad is defined in two ways, 
first, as the internal struggle of a Muslim against one’s own sin, and secondly, as the external 
struggle of all Muslims against enemies of the Islamic community and the religion at large. To 
Kartosuwirjo, the enemy of Islam in Indonesia was the Japanese and Dutch occupations. 
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However, once the struggle for Independence was over, Kartosuwirjo and his allies focused their 
jihad on the newly founded Indonesian State.  
 Their discontent with the Indonesian State was twofold. The PSI and its allies had pushed 
for the formation of an Islamic state with some success, by encouraging and ultimately 
succeeding in having a section of the constitution require all Muslims to follow Islamic law in 
what is now known as the Jakarta Charter of 1945. However, the day after the Jakarta Charter 
was passed,  Indonesian Christians threatened to form their own state throughout the eastern 
Indonesian islands should Islamic law be written into the new constitution. Rather than risk 
dividing the state at a time when the risk of another Dutch invasion was especially high, Islamic 
community representatives agreed to remove the clause from the constitution.1 
 Although the Indonesian State declared independence in 1945, the Dutch launched a 
four-year struggle before fully acknowledging Indonesian independence in 1949. During that 
time came the second affront to the Islamic movement, the Renville agreement of 1948. Ratified 
by the United Nations, the Renville agreement ceded West Java to the Dutch along the “Van 
Mook Line,” a line connecting the furthest advanced Dutch-held positions. It was with the 
signing of the Renville Agreement that Kartosuwirjo launched his full-scale revolt against both 
Dutch occupation as well as the Indonesian State:  
In May 1948, Kartosuwirjo proclaimed himself the Imam (leader) of a new state, which 
he called Darul Islam – which also became the name of his movement – in the first 
regional rebellion to follow Indonesia’s declaration of independence. 32 He followed this 
on 7 August 1949 with a proclamation of Negara Islam Indonesia (NII), the Islamic State 
of Indonesia, in Cisampak, West Java.2 
 
 
1 Solahudin. (2013). Roots of Terrorism in Indonesia : From Darul Islam to Jema'ah Islamiyah, University of New 
South Wales Press, 27. 
2 Ibid, Solahudin. (2013), 35. 
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It was in effect the Renville Agreement that caused the creation of DI and kickstarted the jihad 
movement in Indonesia. The Renville Agreement also represents the crux of the two Indonesian 
Islamic struggles, that against Dutch colonialism as well as the formation of a modernist Islamic 
State in Indonesia. The Indonesian state ceding West Java to the Dutch solidified Kartosuwirjo’s 
belief in the state’s corruption and unviability, and he believed that an Islamic state was the best 
way to combat these problems. 
 As the new leader of DI, Kartosuwirjo implemented Islamic law and military service for 
boys aged sixteen to twenty-four. He divided Indonesia into three zones, Area I, Area II, and 
Area III. Area I applied to anywhere in Indonesia where Islamic law was in full effect, whereas 
Area II was where Islamic law was partially in control, and Area III where there was little to no 
Islamic law, such as the predominantly Christian regions of Flores and West Papua. The goal of 
cadres living in each area was to revolt and transform them into Area I.  
 Kartosuwirjo encountered difficulties in the struggle to transform Areas II and III into 
Area I due to an unforeseen reason: the majority of Indonesia is already Muslim. However, this 
did not imply that all Indonesian Muslims were supportive of an Islamic state or the introduction 
of Sharia law. Kartosuwirjo’s draconian criminal penalties, along with the frequent raiding, 
looting, and taxing of Area I and II residents were a tough sell for most Indonesians. In order to 
address the reluctance of the community to follow his newly implemented criminal code: 
Kartosuwirjo drew upon the idea of takfir – the declaration of a Muslim as apostate. This 
takfiri stance is evident in the NII Criminal Code, where an apostate is defined as anyone 
who rejects the laws of the Islamic state, even if they were born a Muslim from Muslim 
parents. 36 Consciously or otherwise, Kartosuwirjo’s philosophy appears to have 
reflected the war-like conditions he faced, which demanded a black and white stance so 
that one could differentiate between friend and foe.3 
 
 
3 Ibid, Solahudin. (2013), 37. 
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The enforcement of takfir only heightened the differences between Kartosuwirjo’s followers and 
the rest of the Muslim community, a distinction that can also be traced to the 
traditionalist/modernist divide in Indonesia. Takfir is only one example of the radical policies 
adopted by Kartosuwirjo during his quest to form his Islamic state. His policies especially 
angered his longtime friend and religious teacher, Yusuf Taudjiri, who owned the Cipari Islamic 
boarding school, a pesantren in West Java. It was here that Kartosuwirjo’s radicalism and 
revolutionary tendencies transformed to what would now be described as terrorism, as DI 
fighters attacked the boarding school forty-seven times between 1949 to 1958, with the most 
serious attack killing eleven at the boarding school and ten DI insurgents.4 These attacks are one 
of the first indicators of the relationship between pesantren and radical groups, where pesantren 
across Indonesia can be observed as both resisting and also supporting radical movements.  
 Towards the end of the Sukarno administration, the views towards DI changed 
drastically. When DI first emerged, the Indonesian government had very nonchalant views 
towards it, still considering DI “as the ‘bulwark of the Republic’ struggled against the ‘Pasundan 
State’ sponsored by the Dutch in the West Java.”5 As DI had been seen as a result of the people’s 
struggle against Dutch incursions, the state had little desire to squash the rebellion until DI had 
already grown considerably in size, following, and influence. The growth of DI was largely due 
to growing disdain for the government’s acts towards specific regions, such as Sukarno’s 
revoking Aceh’s status of autonomy, making it part of the province of North Sumatra.6 By 1952, 
the Nationalist Cabinet recognized DI as an enemy of the state, as DI’s policies now did not align 
 
4 Ibid, Solahudin. (2013), 38. 
5 Dengel, H. H. (1995). Darul Islam dan Kartosuwiryo: Langkah Perwujudan Angan-Angan yang Gagal. Pustaka 
Sinar Harapan.  
6 Op cit, Solahudin. (2013), 40. 
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with the politics of the administration.7 Although DI had become newly recognized as an enemy, 
it was not until 1960 that the Sukarno administration took a strong military stance against DI 
incursions. 
 In 1959 Sukarno announced the “Guided Democracy,” signifying the official switch 
towards a left-leaning authoritarian regime. Shortly after, in 1960, he commenced the “Pagar 
Betis Operation,” a fairly simple military tactic of employing civilians to isolate and out DI 
insurgents while simultaneously cutting supply lines. The Pagar Betis Operation was a huge 
success and led to the capture and arrest of Kartosuwiryo in 1962.8 Although DI was defeated by 
militarily in 1962, a new opportunity for resurgence emerged in 1965 with the overthrow of the 
Sukarno government and the establishment of the Suharto regime. 
 
Darul Islam (DI) During the Suharto Era 
The rise of Suharto is defined by the mass killings that began in an effort to “cleanse” Indonesia 
of its previous administration. Suharto and his compatriots targeted members of the PKI (Partai 
Komunis Indonesia) but quickly extended their reach to all “suspected” members of the party as 
well as well-known humanitarian, women’s rights, and pro-democracy activists. In order to 
accomplish this task, the brand new regime employed thousands of DI and ex-DI insurgents to 
hunt down, arrest, and murder these new “enemies of the state.” As DI had been a staunch 
opponent to the left-leaning Sukarno government, this new allyship between Suharto’s 
administration and DI proved mutually beneficial. DI was able to use their newfound military 
influence to target not only their political but also their religious adversaries, breathing life back 
 
7 Arrobi, M. (2018). The Making of Islamist-inspired Terrorism and It’s Counter-terrorism in Indonesia. Politik 
Indonesia: Indonesian Political Science Review, 3(2), 224. 
8 Formichi, C. (2012). Islam and the Making of Nation: Kartowuswiryo and Political Islam in twentieth -century 
Indonesia. Leiden: KITLV Press. 
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into a once floundering radical movement. Suharto also bestowed high ranking political, 
military, and economic positions on DI cadre in order to strengthen the relationship between the 
two groups.9 The influence that these positions created only strengthened DI. Throughout the 
1970’s DI members were able to organize and form cells in every major city in Indonesia. 
Multiple terrorist attacks were carried out during this period, especially in Sumatra, including 
bombing a Church, a Christian school, a Quran recitation event, and a series of armed robberies 
in 1976.10 However, these events eventually led to a major government pushback, where the 
Suharto administration labeled DI as a network of “Komando Jihad” and conducted a long series 
of raids and arrests leading up to the national election in 1977.11 In addition, Suharto’s decision 
to use DI insurgents as a counter-communism military force caused DI to lose much of its 
grassroots support, as DI’s reputation changed from a locally supported Islamist movement to 
merely a more extreme branch of the Suharto government. 
 With much of the military power stripped from DI once again, Suharto began his attack 
on the political power of DI as well as other, non-violent Islamic political groups. He did this by 
forcing the consolidation of all the Islamic political parties into one, the United Development 
Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan), and enforcing rules on large gatherings and requiring 
parties affirm Pancasila as their guiding principle.12 Suharto’s decision to requiring Pancasila be 
the guiding political principle angered many Muslim political groups and also coincided with a 
global Islamist movement in the wake of the Iranian revolution of 1979. As Abdullah Sungkar, a 
well-known DI member and founder of Pondok Ngruki, said in his defense plea, the Suharto 
 
9 Op cit, Arrobi, M. (2018), 225.  
10 Temby, Q. (2010). Imagining an Islamic State in Indonesia: From Darul Islam to Jemaah Islamiyah. Indonesia, 1–
36. 
11 Op cit, Arrobi, M. (2018), 226.  
12 Effendi, B. (2004). Islam and the State in Indonesia. Ohio University Press. 
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administration had hijacked another Muslim party, was manipulating political parties in general, 
controlled parliament and manipulated elections, and turned the Indonesian flag and the 
Pancasila into sacred symbols, affectively turning Indonesia into a totalitarian state, among 
many other abuses of power.13 These factors, within the context of a greater, global Islamist 
movement, all coincided to form Indonesia’s second major radical group, Jema’ah Islamiyah 
(JI), at the turn of the 1980’s. 
 
Jema’ah Islamiyah (JI) and the Suharto Era 
During the 1980’s DI was led in a new direction, namely away from “local jihadism” 
with Sufi mystical underpinnings to a larger network more focused on global Islamism.14 It was 
under the leadership of two Indonesian political exiles operating in Malaysia, Abdullah Sungkar 
(as previously mentioned) and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, that nearly 200 JI operatives traveled to 
Afghanistan to receive Al-Qaeda military training. Sungkar and Baasyir had both visited the 
Middle East with some frequency and met with Osama Bin Laden in order to strengthen ties in 
the region.15 They also built their recruiting network largely off of the pesantren that they helped 
to found, Pondok Ngruki in Solo, Central Java. During this period, the men sent to Afghanistan 
were still considered a part of DI. However, after receiving religious instruction along with their 
military training, the members started to abandon their old views ascribed to them by DI, and 
brought these new ideas back to Indonesia. This change in doctrine is what caused the official 
split from DI to (JI) Jema’ah Islamiyah, officially forming a new group in 1993.16 From 1993 to 
 
13 Jones, S. (2010). New Order Repression and the Birth of Jemaah Islamiyah. In E. Aspinall & G. Fealy (Eds.), 
Soeharto’s New Order and its Legacy: Essays in honour of Harold Crouch. Canberra: ANU Publisher.  
14 Op cit, Arrobi, M. (2018), 228. 
15 Abuza, Z. (2007). Political Islam and Violence in Indonesia. Routledge, London and New York. 
16 Op cit, Solahudin. (2013), 7.  
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1998 JI’s main focus was on the Indonesian government, however this changed when Osama bin 
Laden released his infamous declaration for all jihadis to focus their efforts on the war against 
America and its allies.17 Although there was considerable debate among JI about whether to 
focus fully on this new war, it was bin Laden’s declaration that eventually led to the first Bali 
bombing in 2002. 
 
Terrorism in Post-Suharto Indonesia and the Legacy of the Bali Bombings 
 After 32 years as president, Suharto resigned in May of 1998. He was succeeded by 
Bacharuddin Jusuf (BJ) Habibie, the third president of Indonesia. JI as an organization decided to 
endorse Habibie, viewing him as a step in the right direction for the Muslim community. During 
the presidential transition, JI continued to send cadres to Afghanistan for military training. 
Although JI recognized the long-term process needed to turn Indonesia into the Islamic State that 
they had been working towards for so many years, many of the organization’s goals were yet 
unfulfilled. They began to survey buildings in Jakarta, taking note of layout, occupancy, location, 
and security in order to choose the best targets. Sungkar and Baasyir met with bin Laden again in 
August 1998 and sent a letter to upper-echelon members of DI and JI, urging them to take up the 
war against the United States.18 DI largely rejected the idea, and there was a split within JI 
concerning whether to join or not. These debates were largely put to rest when a conflict broke 
out between Muslim and Christian youth in Ketapang, leading to high tensions and violence 
across the archipelago where both Muslim and Christian communities were particularly strong.19 
As it became clear to the extremist groups that Muslims in Indonesia were at heightened risk 
 
17 Ibid, Solahudin. (2013), 8.  
18 Ibid, Solahudin. (2013), 171.  
19 Braithwaite, J. Dunn, L. (2010). 3. Maluku and North Maluku (PDF). Anomie and Violence: Non-truth and 
reconciliation in Indonesian peacebuilding. The Australian National University. 147. 
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from Christian violence, the debate over fighting domestic versus international enemies was put 
to rest for the time being. JI began to raise funds to begin a jihad in Ambon in 1999, the largest 
city in the Maluku islands, where tensions were the highest. These new funds and organization 
breathed life back into a faltering JI, especially in Maluku.20 
 At the height of JI’s successes in 1999, Abdullah Sungkar died. His death left a vacuum 
in JI leadership, causing many leaders to break off and start their own offensives, including 
scattered bombings and targeted attacks across Indonesia. These culminated on Christmas Eve, 
2000 with attacks in 11 Indonesia cities targeting religious sites, killing 20 and injuring 120. The 
hope was that these attacks would cause a retaliation from the targeted Christians, but this proved 
not to be the case.21 From 1999-2001 the attacks in Indonesia were focused on religious 
differences, mainly towards Christians and Muslim communities considered to be opposed to an 
Islamic State. However, everything changed on September 11, 2001. 
 Just days after the attacks on 9/11, operatives in Indonesia began planning their own 
domestic attacks. The new targets were to be places occupied by foreigners, rather than sites 
targeting Christian Indonesians. Many of the original plots were thwarted by a wave of arrests in 
Singapore and Malaysia. However, once the operatives decided on a date, September 11, 2002, 
and a location, Bali, there was no stopping them. The original date was set to commemorate the 
attacks on 9/11, but they there was not enough time and pushed back the attacks. Due to the 
declaration of jihad on America and its allies, they chose two popular entertainment venues 
frequented by tourists, the Sari Club and Padi’s Bar, as well as the American consulate. Finally, 
on the night of Saturday, October 12th 2002, bombs exploded in both venues, killing 202 people, 
 
20 Op cit, Solahudin. (2013), 178. 
21 Ibid, Solahudin. (2013), 182. 
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mostly Australians. Less than a month later the arrests ensued, with the orchestrator of the 
attacks arrested in Lamongan, East Java on November 5th.22  
 The Bali Bombings of 2002 are largely considered a turning point in the Indonesian 
government’s response to Islamism and domestic terrorism. As more arrests were made, 
Indonesian counter terrorism forces were better equipped to disrupt the greater organizations, 
causing organized large-scale attacks to grind to a halt. As Mohammad Zaki Arrobi notes, the 
rise in the number of attacks in Indonesia following Bali is a mark of the decline of the 
movement, not a mark of triumph. JI members acknowledged, in interviews and court 
depositions, how Bali had damaged their cause. Following the Bali bombings the War on Terror 
was effectively brought to Indonesia, with the United States and Australia both committing funds 
and personnel to aid in the Indonesian terrorism crackdown of the early 2000’s. The string of 
arrests also changed the manner of domestic terrorism in Indonesia, from organized and large 
scale attacks on religious centers and sites frequented by foreigners to small, single-person 
attacks focused on targeting police and military targets. These include the attack on Hamparan 
Police station in 2010, the bombing of a police mosque in Cirebon in 2011, the suicide bombing 
of the Solo police station in 2016, and the Sarinah-Jakarta attack, the first ISIS-claimed attack in 
Southeast Asia, which targeted a police station at the beginning of 2016.23 
 Indonesia’s approach to counterterrorism is twofold; with a “hard” approach as well as a 
“soft” approach. Unsurprisingly, the United States backed the “hard” approach, providing funds 
and personnel training to for “Special Detachment 88,” (Densus 88) a counterterrorism task force 
that has been under intense scrutiny in recent years for possible human rights violations, 
unlawful arrests, torture, and mysterious deaths. In comparison, Australia poured money into the 
 
22 (2012) The 12 October 2002 Bali Bombing Plot. BBC News, BBC. www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-19881138. 
23 Singh, J. (2016). Operation Tinombala: Indonesia’s New Counter-Terrorism Strategy. Singapore. 
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National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT), a government bureau that focuses on 
deradicalization and deconstructing radical ideology. BNPT hosts interfaith dialogues, cultural 
exchanges, and campaigns for a more liberal version of Islam as the solution for religious 
hostility in Indonesia.24  
 
Military Counterterrorism: The “Hard Approach” 
The United States launched the War on Terror in the aftermath of the attacks on 9/11. In 
order to disseminate the U.S. counterterrorism approach to the rest of the world, President 
George W. Bush Jr adopted what is called the “stick and carrot” approach which involves 
rewarding countries that adopt U.S. policy and punishing those who do not. Rewards came in the 
form of monetary, military, and humanitarian aid, while punishments were usually in the form of 
trade, military, and government sanctions.25 Indonesia’s sweeping counterterrorism law is 
modeled after the U.S. Patriot Act. It is called Act No. 15 Year 2003 on the Eradication of 
Terrorism Crimes, and describes the punitive action allowed by the government in the aftermath 
of a terrorist attack, such as the Bali Bombings of the previous year. The law outlined in depth 
the measures to be taken by the government following an attack, but it left out any detail of 
measures to prevent future attacks, and does not limit the spread of radicalism across the country. 
Since the law’s enactment in 2003, there has been stiff protest by Indonesians and international 
Human Groups alike, most recently in 2017 when revisions were proposed to the law that would 
strip Indonesians of their national citizenship for:  
...traveling abroad to “join wars overseas in order to commit terrorism crimes,” and 
permit criminal penalties for any “speech, though, behavior, or writings” that could lead 
to “actions which adversely impact other people/communities.” The open-ended language 
 
24 Op cit. Arrobi, M. (2018), 232. 
25 Hilmy, M. (2013). The Politics of Retaliation: the Backlash of Radical Islamists to the Deradicalization Project in 
Indonesia. Al-Jami'ah: Journal of Islamic Studies, 140.  
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of the proposed revisions to the counterterrorism law will facilitate violations of the 
rights to free expression and nationality.”26 
 
Since the law’s enactment in 2003 the circle of radical Islamists in Indonesia have used human 
rights as a unifying force under which to oppose the law, making the situation especially 
tenuous. On the one hand, the Bali Bombings necessitated a stronger government response to 
domestic terrorism in Indonesia, however the ultimately unsuccessful War on Terror and the 
myriad human rights abuses which it caused have been a sticking point in successful 
deradicalization efforts across the globe.  
 In addition to new legislative counterterrorism approaches the United States has 
supported Indonesia militarily. Special Taskforce 88 is a military and police effort to put Act No. 
15 into full effect, and has been funded by the US through the Ministry of External Affairs 
(Menlu) of the US and under direct training of the instructors of the CIA, FBI, and the US Secret 
Service.27 Act No. 15 in conjunction with the Special Taskforce 88 have been largely successful, 
responsible for the arrest of some 700 suspected extremists with 500 serving jail time. However 
the vast majority of military action taken by Special Taskforce 88 have been through “shoot-to-
kill” fatal raids, leaving many terrorism suspects dead on site before ever being brought to 
justice.  
 
Deradicalization: The “Soft Approach” 
In response to the growing backlash from Special Taskforce 88, the Indonesian 
government founded the National Body of Countermeasure of Terrorism/BNPT by presidential 
 
26 (2017). Indonesia: Counterterrorism Law Changes Threaten Rights, Reject Proposals to Restrict Speech, Revoke 
Citizenship. Human Rights Watch. 
27(2012). Propaganda Terorisme di Indonesia. Eramuslim, Media Islam Rujukan.  
 
Bruckner, 20 
decree in 2010. Ansyaad Mbai, the head of BNPT, signed a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU) with 8 Indonesian Muslim organizations who agreed to become involved in a series of 
projects “to curb, prevent and counteract the development of radical Islamist ideology.”28 New 
programs have since been put in place to reach a wider audience and employ multiple 
government and nongovernment organizations, as well as educational and religious groups. One 
of the most promising approaches to deradicalization lies within the curriculum of the pesantren, 
where some scholars are beginning to acknowledge progress being made in even the most 
notorious extremist strongholds, like Pondok Ngruki in Solo. While deradicalization efforts are 
still met with some pushback from the more radical fringes of Indonesian Islamic society, we are 
beginning to see the groundwork being laid for a more comprehensive and sweeping approach 
from the Indonesian government to smooth the swell of extremism across the archipelago. Of 
course, any approach to deradicalization will require very strong financial, governmental, and 
community support, but it is possible given some of the small successes that these 
deradicalization organizations are beginning to achieve.  
 The risk of terrorist attacks in Indonesia is still very real, however the broader movement 
of utilizing terrorism to forge the way towards an Islamic State in Indonesia has largely been 
stopped. Fear is another factor to be contended with when carrying out counter-terrorism efforts, 
as many Islamic symbols are now perceived as symbols of extremism. These include the niqab, a 
traditional covering for women that covers everything except the eyes, and pesantrens, Islamic 
boardings schools, have faced more backlash recently for being perceived as the “hotbed” of 
domestic terrorism instruction in Indonesia. The next wave of deradicalization and 
counterterrorism in Indonesia will have to rely heavily on dismantling stigma surrounding the 
 
28 Op Cit, Hilmy, M. (2013), 142. 
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many forms of Islamic expression, and to encourage cross-cultural and religious understanding 
between different Muslim and non-Muslim groups. Overcoming prejudice is surely the next step 
in Indonesia’s counterterrorism efforts.   
Bruckner, 22 
 
Counterterrorism in Indonesia Post-Bali and the  
Heightened Role of Pesantren in Deradicalization 
 
In order to fully explore the roles pesantrens have in current counterterrorism and 
deradicalization efforts, and how important these roles will be in the future, it is important to 
recognize the relationships held by pesantrens both in support of and in opposition to extremism 
in the past. Often the scholarship surrounding pesantrens focuses on the institutions that 
“produced” known extremists, however I believe that this broad-stroke approach to the field is 
counterproductive and does little in understanding the “creation” of extremists in general. To put 
it in perspective, every American criminal, mass shooter, and corrupt politician came from the 
American school system, yet nobody paints U.S. schools as hotbeds for criminality, despite the 
United States having one of the highest incarceration rates in the entire world. 
 
Pondok Ngruki and the Reputation Problem 
Most Indonesian pesantrens associated with extremism are a part of a syndicate called 
the Ngruki Network. The network is largely considered the main link between Al Qaeda and 
domestic terrorism in Indonesia, and operates out of a pesantren in Solo, central Java, called 
Pondok Ngruki.29 Pondok Ngruki is arguably the most notorious radical pesantren in Indonesia, 
and has been the topic of a large volume of terrorism scholarship since its founding in the 
1970’s. Pondok Ngruki was founded by Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, two figures 
whose history I discussed in depth in the previous chapter. Ngruki was instrumental to the 
 
29 (2016). Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: The Case of the Ngruki Network in Indonesia. Crisis Group. 
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foundation, growth, organization, and education of new members to DI and later to JI as well. 
Although Sungkar has since died, Ba’asyir is still alive and walks free, having served almost two 
decades in exile and another fifteen years in prison for charges related to his involvement in JI 
and other terrorism-related charges. In May 2007, Farish A. Noor, a historian, scholar, and 
faculty member at the Nanyang Technical University in Singapore, had just completed field 
work at Pondok Ngruki and was even able to interview and photograph Ba’asyir. Noor’s paper, 
Ngruki Revisited: Modernity and Its Discontents at the Pondok Pesantren al-Mukmin of Ngruki, 
Surakarta, offers new insight into the process of progress at Ngruki, and the challenges of 
studying such a polarizing topic and what many consider to be its source. He describes an 
especially important field work approach: “having to constantly distinguish between the 
institution (or in this case, as we shall show below, institutions) and the personalities linked to it, 
who have been blown up to be larger than life.”30 I find that this distinction is vital to effective 
terrorism scholarship, and have tried to keep Noor’s strategy at the forefront of my research 
process. 
In 1970 Sungkar was appointed as the leader of the DI branch based in Solo. Shortly after 
he received the financial support to buy land in the town of Ngruki and began the construction of 
the pesantren. It was here that Sungkar began lecturing on the importance of upholding Islamic 
law and rejecting man-made laws, going so far as to encourage the members of the Solo mosque 
to leave the 1977 presidential election ballot blank.31 It was the stronghold at Ngruki that 
allowed DI to flourish in Solo and subsequently in Yogyakarta. Starting in 1987, Ngruki 
students, teachers, and alumni started traveling abroad to receive military training.32 However, 
 
30 Noor, Farish A. (2007) Ngruki Revisited: Modernity and Its Discontents at the Pondok Pesantren Al-Mukmin of 
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most new recruits came from already-connected families, and recruitment was left out of the 
school curriculum or official school events. 
Ngruki has often been cited as instrumental not only in the early development of the 
Islamist movement, but also as the educational background of multiple modern Indonesian 
domestic terrorists, such as Amrozi and Ali Imron of the first Bali Bombing as well as a man 
convicted of committing a police shooting, Bayu Setiono.33 In addition, many Ngruki graduates 
have later gone on to start their own pesantrens, raising concerns about the proliferation of 
extremism across Java specifically and Indonesia more broadly. While there seems to be a clear 
link between Pondok Ngruki, Solo, and Indonesian extremism, it is near-sighted to assume that 
the region is beyond repair and incapable of entering and maintaining a period of 
deradicalization successfully. This myopic scholarship can be read in articles such as The Nature 
of Radical Islamic Groups in Solo, by Muhammad Wildan, a Yogyakarta-based scholar. He 
writes:  
Undeniably, based on the all the above many people assumed that Pondok Ngruki is the 
centre for radical Islamism in sense of violence in Indonesia. Although some people are 
may objected to this accusation, the facts has proved on the other way around. In 
addition, the existence of several other Ngruki- like pesantrens co-founded by Ngruki 
graduates in the outer regions of Solo, as Dār al-Shahadah in Boyolali and Ma’had Aly 
Al-Nūr in Sukoharjo, convinced people to the accusation. Although the authorities could 
not prove the involvement of Ba’asyir in the JI, the existence of JI is undeniable. 
Moreover, that the region of Solo is quite central for JI underlined my suspicious that the 
region is prolific of such radical Islamism.34 
 
Many scholars like Wildan utilize an underlying tone of irreconcilability when discussing 
Pondok Ngruki and the people and pesantrens that have come about because of it. The fact that 
these movements have risen from the Solo area does not even necessarily conclude that everyday 
Muslims living in the region are particularly committed to Islamism, much less extremism. As 
 
33 Op Cit, Hilmy, M. (2013), 153. 
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discussed in the previous section, although radical groups do work to recruit new members from 
the regions in which they are based, it is much easier for radical groups to lose their grassroots 
support, such was the case with the decline in support for DI after they became involved in the 
mass killings against Suharto’s political enemies in the 1960’s. Wildan claims that weak political 
influence and globalization mixing with underlying socio-cultural problems that lead to Solo 
becoming an Islamist stronghold, and I believe that there is a clear method that needs to be taken 
by the Joko Widodo (Jokowi) administration to address these issues and subsequently institute a 
strong deradicalization effort in the area. What has been written can always be erased, and 
addressing inequality, increasing cross-cultural and cross-religious understanding are two 
important ways to start.  
 Noor’s paper works to lift some of the fog away from Pondok Ngruki by highlighting its 
modernity despite its reputation. First and foremost, the curriculum of Pondok Ngruki has 
followed the standards set by the Department of Religious Affairs since the 1980’s, meaning that 
it is up to the standards of state-run and other accredited religious institutions. This means 
students are enrolled in both religious and secular subjects, which are compulsory for graduation. 
As Abdul Matin bin Salman writes in his paper Living Hadis of Tolerance in Multicultural 
Education: A leadership Study in Pesantren Al Mukmin Ngruki Sukoharjo Surakarta, “this 
pesantren has the same understanding with most other Muslims that various violent forms in the 
name of religion is not part of Islamic teachings.”35 However, Noor acknowledges that 
“Teaching the principles of National Citizenship has always been a problem at Ngruki, given the 
steadfast opposition to the state’s Pancasila ideology—implemented during the Suharto era—
 
35  Salman, A. M. B. (2017), Living Hadis of Tolerance in Multicultural Education: A Leadership Study in 
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from some of the teachers of the pesantren.”36 In addition, Ba’asyir still acts as an advisor to the 
board of directors, but no longer holds any power to enact changes within the school’s structure 
or curriculum. Since 1972 the Indonesian has kept a close eye on Ngruki, including video and 
personal surveillance as well as going so far as to send a former graduate of Ngruki, Noor Huda 
Ismail, to gain access to the institution and to closely monitor Ba’asyir and  
Sungkar.37 More than anything, it appears that in the modern day Ngruki faces a reputation 
problem than an actual threat of extremism. Although it does not appear that any large-scale 
deradicalization programs have yet taken place on the Ngruki campus, there are multiple similar 
pesantrens across Indonesia that have implemented such measures in order to combat both 
problems: extremism and stigma.  
 
Current Deradicalization Programs Across Indonesia and Necessary Next Steps 
 There are many obstacles that need to be overcome for a successful deradicalization 
approach to be initiated across Indonesia. One of the largest in my opinion is what Masdar Hilmy 
describes as “tacit sympathy,” otherwise described as the phenomena of moderate Muslims 
feeling no strong disdain or disagreement with their more radical counterparts, especially when 
extremists use Muslim suffering or United States hegemony as a unifying force.38 Hilmy argues 
that approaching this obstacle necessitates a twofold approach, with action from both the federal 
government as well as “boots on the ground” grassroots implementation. At the government 
level, moderate ideology needs to be first created and then inscribed in conjunction with 
deconstructing radical ideology. I interpret these actions as using the Quran and other related 
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Islamic texts that highlight the necessity of cross-religious understanding, tolerance, and 
acceptance, while simultaneously rejecting any texts that either misinterpret the Quran or attempt 
to substantiate areas that later become extreme, such as Ba’asyir’s belief in Islamic absolutism 
that places Islam above any other religion, pitting all others against Islam as enemies to the 
religion in the name of jihad. Then these new ideologies need to be disseminated across the 
archipelago, through the help of well-trained and well-educated members of each Muslim 
community. These members are ideally leaders in their community, ones that carry a moral and 
ideological weight which is accompanied by cultural and community credibility. Hilmy asserts in 
his research that ideologues, or the spearheads and disseminators of ideology, are more important 
to radical movements than the ideologies themselves. I choose to corroborate this notion and thus 
assert the necessity of an equally strong, widespread team of ideologues that operate within the 
deradicalization camp, in essence to use the radicalism model against itself.  
 Deradicalization in communities must also take place in spaces that are familiar and 
comforting to community members, such as mosques, the homes of community leaders, and 
educational institutions, most importantly pesantrens. To that effect, peace education has proved 
instrumental during these early stages of deradicalization. Addressing radicalism at a young age 
proves much more effective than waiting until later stages of life to introduce new ideologies, 
especially when educating already active members or aspiring recruits to extremism 
organizations. Ricardo L. Garcia in his book, Teaching in Pluralistic Society, states that in order 
to improve social relations and social facts that are relatively prejudicial, discriminatory and 
marginalized, it is necessary to consider a way in social education and religious education that 
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contains a reconciliatory, mediative, consensual, accommodative, and negotiative attitude.39 
Basing peace education in reconciliation would actively combat absolutism within Islamic 
educational practices as well as encourage students to recognize absolutism when it's being 
taught, and thus be able to combat it within their own educational praxis.  
I believe that reconciliation can be applied specifically in Indonesia through the lens of 
the Pancasila, although given the tumultuous history between radicalism and opposing the 
Pancasila this may prove difficult. However, many pesantrens already attempt to uphold “the 
cultural slogan of ‘Togetherness in Diversity and Indonesianness’ which involves people of 
various religions... brotherhood is not confined to the five religions, but also extended to anyone 
who wishes to be good and worship God sincerely and honestly and put forward the peace of 
nation and state life,” which is a central tenet of the Pancasila.40 Reconciliation is described in 
Pesantren and Peace Education Development: Challenges, Strategies and Contribution to 
Deradicalization in Indonesia by Muhammad Thoyib as eliminating “hatred in the plurality of 
people. This is in line with the view of Ursula Franklin that peace is not only a lack of war, but 
also the creation of justice and the loss of fear and hatred within individuals and society.”41 
 There are a few challenges to enacting peace education in pesantrens across Indonesia. 
For one, not all pesantrens are recognized by the Department of Religious Affairs, meaning that 
their curriculum is not government recognized and there is not a true form of government 
oversight concerning the school. This can be problematic for a few reasons, largely because there 
is no system of checks and balances in place to ensure all the unrecognized pesantrens aren’t 
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teaching radical ideology or using their platform for recruiting. In addition, with there being 
approximately 40 17,000 pesantrens across Indonesia, without all of them being recognized by 
the Department of Religious Affairs there’s no way the government could ensure a peace 
education process was put in place in every single school, much less that it is taught by an 
accredited teacher with peace education and deradicalization training. In addition, deconstructing 
already-held ideology, as well as teaching new ideologies (especially told older students) can be 
unconvincing and lackadaisical if carried out in the wrong way. It is essential that new ideologies 
be introduced in a way that is fresh as well as familiar, using the Quran and following the 
Prophet’s teachings in order to reverse radical ideology.  
Peace education can easily be linked to already-existing teaching practices within 
pesantrens. Namely, by teaching a broad array of Islamic and non-Islamic scholars, pesantren 
“provides students with knowledge of, and appreciation for, the complexities of Islamic 
thought.”42 Woodward and Rohmaniyah argue that a well-rounded Islamic education is a 
stronger barrier against radicalization than a secular education, in that people with a rich 
understanding of the Quran are more likely to recognize when passages and texts are either used 
incorrectly, too literally, or out of context. In addition, students who graduate from pesantrens 
are able to read the Quran in its original Arabic, rather than relying on Indonesian translations 
that can easily become murky depending on the goals of the translator. Woodward and 
Rohmaniyah also write: 
Young people who do not have solid Islamic educations can easily be misled by appeals 
to seemingly clear textual references to violence. Students who have been schooled in 
Qur’an and Hadith scholarship are not so easily fooled. They tend to view jihadi rhetoric 
as simplistic distortions of Islamic teachings because they have the theological tools 
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necessarily to deconstruct it. The more people know about Islam, the less likely they are 
to become radicals. Pesantren are among the most important sources of this knowledge.43 
There is evidence to suggest that over recent years, more students at secular schools and 
universities are turning to radicalism than those from pesantrens, linking Woodward and 
Rohmaniyah’s statement. I believe that addressing radicalism at secular schools will require a 
different approach than it will at pesantrens. However, I believe that peace education will be a 
vital role in both instances, along with community outreach and instruction in Islam for students 
who attend secular institutions. More than anything, deradicalization will require strong 
government financial and ideological support. To combat resistance from radical groups, it will 
be important to ensure that deradicalization focuses heavily on the inclusivity and beauty of the 
Islamic faith, which must be closely tied with Quranic teachings and instruction in Islamic 
thinkers from across many time periods. As the world continues down a long path of 
globalization, it is crucial that Indonesia addresses radicalism swiftly, strongly, and effectively, 
in order to protect and serve all Indonesians in the future. 
 
Conclusion 
It is clear that the role of pesantrens in institutionalizing deradicalization cannot be 
overstated. Through my own experiences at pesantrens I can attest to the religious piety, 
dedication, and humility that each student must reflect in order to do well both academically and 
psychologically at a pesantren. I also believe that pursuing an Islamic education is a worthwhile 
and gratifying endeavor, and that Islamic education should not be considered an enemy as 
deradicalization takes a center stage in Indonesian domestic policy. While there are many more 
aspects to deradicalization that I was not able to address in this paper, such as the current 
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deradicalization procedures that take place within the walls of Indonesian prisons, secular 
institutions, and community outreach, I believe that deradicalization in each setting will have 
similar themes, and must be considered to be one cohesive unit with many parts, rather than a 
great number of small and disconnected efforts. By putting pesantrens at the forefront of the 
deradicalization effort, the government will be simultaneously working to deconstruct extremism 
as well as the stigma which has engulfed Islamic educational institutions since the 1970’s, which 
has only become more prevalent in the age of the War on Terror. Every successful approach to 
deradicalization within a pesantren will instill more confidence in the Indonesian people in the 
importance of Islamic education when combating radicalism. History has lead both Indonesians 
and foreigners alike to consider pesantrens as “jihadi breeding grounds” and “hotbeds of 
extremism,” so it is more important now than ever before that stigma be deconstructed at the 
same time that extremism is deconstructed across Indonesia. It is absolutely crucial that a strong, 
twofold approach to deradicalization, focusing on peace education be what prevents the next Bali 
Bombing, rather than another military raid.  
Bruckner, 32 
Works Cited 
Abuza, Z. (2003). Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror. London: Lynne Rienner.  
Publishers. 
 





Arrobi, M. (2018). The Making of Islamist-inspired Terrorism and It’s Counter-terrorism in 
Indonesia. Politik Indonesia: Indonesian Political Science Review, 3(2), 217-238. 
doi:https://doi.org/10.15294/ipsr.v3i2.13673 
 
Aspinall, E., & Fealy, G. (Eds.). (2010). Soeharto’s New Order and its Legacy: Essays in honour 




Beech, H., & Suhartono, M. (2019, October 18). At a School for Suicide Bombers' Children, 





Braithwaite, J. Dunn, L. (2010). 3. Maluku and North Maluku (PDF). Anomie and Violence: 
Non-truth and reconciliation in Indonesian peacebuilding. The Australian National 
University. 
 
Dengel, H. H. (1995). Darul Islam dan Kartosuwiryo: Langkah Perwujudan Angan-Angan yang  
Gagal. Pustaka Sinar Harapan.  
Effendi, B. (2003). Islam and the State in Indonesia. Singapore: ISEAS Publishing. 
Formichi, C. (2012). Islam and the Making of Nation: Kartowuswiryo and Political Islam in 
twentieth-century Indonesia. Leiden: KITLV Press. 
 
Hilmy, M. (2013). The Politics of Retaliation: the Backlash of Radical Islamists to the 
Deradicalization Project in Indonesia. Al-Jami'ah: Journal of Islamic Studies, 51(1), 
129-158. doi:https://doi.org/10.14421/ajis.2013.511.129-158 
 
Indonesia: Counterterrorism Law Changes Threaten Rights. (2017, July 13). Human Rights 




Malik, A. (2017). Stigmatization of Islamic School: Pesantren, Radicalism and Terrorism in 
Bruckner, 33 
Bima. Ulumuna, 21(1), 173–210. doi: 10.20414/ujis.v21i1.1159 
 
Noor, F. A. (2007). Ngruki Revisited: Modernity and Its Discontents at the Pondok Pesantren 
al-Mukmin of Ngruki, Surakarta. S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. 
Retrieved from https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/44092/WP139.pdf 
 
Paddock, R. C., & Oo, M. (2020, March 23). The 'Niqab Squad' Wants Women to Be Seen 








Person. (2012). Propaganda Terrorism di Indonesia. Eramuslim, Media Islam Rujukan. 
Retrieved 2 May 2020 From: https://www.eramuslim.com  
 
Salman, A. M. B. (2017). Living Hadis of Tolerance in Multicultural Education: A Leadership 
Study in Pesantren Al Mukmin Ngruki Sukoharjo Surakarta. Jurnal Pendidikan Islam, 
6(2), 397. doi: 10.14421/jpi.2017.62.397-425 
Singh, J. (2016). Operation Tinombala:Indonesia’s New Counter-Terrorism Strategy. Singapore. 
Solahudin, & McRae, D. (2013). The roots of terrorism in Indonesia: from Darul Islam to 
Jemaah Islamiyah. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
 
Sukabdi, Z. A. (2015). Terrorism In Indonesia: A Review On Rehabilitation And 
Deradicalization. Journal of Terrorism Research, 6(2). doi: 10.15664/jtr.1154 
 
Temby, Q. (2010). Imagining an Islamic State in Indonesia: From Darul Islam to Jemaah 
Islamiyah. Indonesia, 1–36. 
 
The 12 October 2002 Bali bombing plot. (2012, October 11). British Broadcasting Service World 
News. Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-19881138 
 
Thoyib, M. (2018). Pesantren and Peace Education Development: Challenges, Strategies and 
Contribution to Deradicalization in Indonesia. Madania: Jurnal Kajian Keislaman,  
22(2), 225 - 238. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.29300/madania.v22i2.1174 
 
Wildan, M. (2013). The Nature of Radical Islamic Groups in Solo. Journal of Indonesian Islam, 
7(1), 49-70. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.15642/JIIS.2013.7.1.49-70 
 
Woodward, M., Rohmaniyah, I., Amin, A., Coleman, D. (2010). Muslim Education, Celebrating 
Islam and Having Fun As Counter-Radicalization Strategies in Indonesia. Perspectives 
on 




Yumitro, G., Kurniawati, D. E., Saiman, S., & Haffsari, P. P. (2019). The Modalities And Roles 
Of Pesantren To Face The Issues Of Terrorism In The Region Of Malang. MIQOT: 
Jurnal Ilmu-Ilmu Keislaman, 43(1), 95. doi: 10.30821/miqot.v43i1.64  
Bruckner, 35 
Recommendations for Further Study 
 
Although conducting my research in a secondary-source format was not how I envisioned 
my ISP period, it was still a time of great academic and personal growth for me as a researcher 
and as a student. Although there is much more to cover than what I have chosen to discuss in this 
paper, I hope I was able to make it clear why my focus on pesantrens was worthwhile and 
worthy of study. Naturally, my research would have been greatly improved by participant 
observation and interviews, however with the time difference and language barriers, not to 
mention the difficulty finding subjects to interview would be, I was forced to focus on source 
material instead. Bu Ari was kind enough to send me the contact information of two subjects for 
remote interviews, but I was unable to coordinate remote interviews within the timeframe and 
the constraints of conducting an ISP from home. One is a contact at UNIDA Gontor by the name 
of Afrih, and the other is a professor at UGM called Agus Wahyudi. Both people would be 
excellent sources of information should a future student choose to study a similar topic to my 
own. Additionally, I would recommend researching areas of history where deradicalization was 
already attempted, as I was unable to find information on such phenomena. I hope my ISP 
provided the reader with sufficient understanding of the topic and leaves areas for further study 
in the future.  
